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When preschoolers evaluate actions and agents, they typically neglect agents’ intentions
and focus on action outcomes instead. By contrast, intentions count much more
than outcomes for older children and adults. This phenomenon has traditionally been
seen as evidence of a developmental change in children’s concept of what is morally
good and bad. However, a growing number of studies shows that infants are able to
reason about agents’ intentions and take them into account in their spontaneous socio-
moral evaluations. Here we argue that this puzzling U-shaped trajectory in children’s
judgments is best accounted for by a model that posits developmental continuity in
moral competence and emphasizes the effect of immature executive function skills on
preschoolers’ performance.
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Mental state reasoning is required in several tasks, from inferential communication and the
interpretation of social situations to the socio-moral evaluation of actions and agents. Children
at an early age start to accuse peers by crying loudly “you did it on purpose!,” and legal systems
typically distinguish harmful acts that are performed intentionally from acts that accidentally
produce personal harm. A large body of developmental research investigated when and how
children acquire the ability to attend to agents’ intentions and action outcomes in their socio-
moral judgments, but the conclusions one can draw from infant studies seem at odds with the
conclusions one can draw from studies on older children. Infants seem to possess abilities that
young preschoolers’ responses do not reveal. In the present work, we address this puzzle by first
reviewing relevant results on socio-moral reasoning in infants and children. Then, we evaluate
different proposals put forward to explain the reported developmental changes and the apparent
contradiction between infants and preschool children’s responses.
THE OUTCOME-TO-INTENT SHIFT IN PRESCHOOLERS’
MORAL REASONING
Since Piaget’s (1932/1965) seminal work, a large body of studies has shown that a crucial
developmental change from an outcome- to an intent-based moral evaluation occurs in the late
preschool years. A typical Piagetian task would consist of evaluating which of two characters is
more naughty and deserves to be punished. Piaget presented children with a story in which a
supposedly well-intentioned character accidentally caused serious material damage (e.g., he broke
15 cups), and another story in which a bad-intentioned character caused, also by accident, less
serious damage (e.g., he broke one cup). Younger children (aged 6–7) judged the character that
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produced serious material damage to be more naughty and
punishable, whereas older children judged the bad-intentioned
one to be more naughty and punishable. These and other
similar findings were taken as evidence of a shift from an initial
outcome-based (‘objective’) moral judgment to a later intent-
based (‘subjective’) moral judgment.
Subsequent research overcame several methodological
limitations of Piaget’s work (King, 1971; Farnill, 1974; Karniol,
1978; Nelson, 1980), but confirmed the occurrence of an
outcome-to-intent shift. During the 1970s and 1980s, many
different tasks were developed to investigate this phenomenon.
By reducing the cognitive processing necessary to answer
experimenters’ questions, scholars found that even preschoolers,
at age 3, can attend to agents’ intentions in their moral
evaluations (e.g., Armsby, 1971; Farnill, 1974; Yuill, 1984; Yuill
and Perner, 1988). Nevertheless, Piaget’s main claim concerning
the outcome-to-intent shift found further support, since children
older than 4–5 years relied more on intention and less on
outcome, whereas younger children showed the opposite pattern
(e.g., Costanzo et al., 1973; Imamoglu, 1975; Keasey, 1978; Moran
and O’Brien, 1983; Baird and Astington, 2004; Wainryb et al.,
2005; Nobes et al., 2009; Cushman et al., 2013).
When intentions and outcomes lead to conflicting responses,
as in the cases of failed attempts to harm and accidental harm,
young preschoolers attend to outcome more than older children,
relying mostly on outcome (e.g., Helwig et al., 1995), or equally on
intention and outcomes (e.g., Killen et al., 2011; Cushman et al.,
2013). With age, the condemnation of attempted but failed harm
increases (Helwig et al., 1995), whereas the condemnation of
accidental harm decreases (Cushman et al., 2013; see also Killen
et al., 2011 on the development of an intent-based punishability
evaluation).
While intentions dominate adults’ attribution of moral
goodness and badness, adults often rely on both intent and
outcomes to evaluate the punishability of agents (Cushman,
2008). A recent dual-process model explains why this is so: adults’
moral reasoning is generated by the work of two independent
and sometimes conflicting processes, one that attributes value
to actions and assesses agents’ mental states, and the other
that evaluates the causal responsibility for action outcomes
(Cushman, 2013, 2015). This proposal contradicts the Piagetian
view, which posited a full replacement of the outcome-based
judgment by an intent-based judgment.
INFANTS’ INTENT-BASED
SOCIO-MORAL EVALUATIONS
Extrapolating the developmental trajectory found in
preschoolers, one may predict that infants and toddlers
would rely mostly on action outcome rather than agents’
intention, assuming that they can produce a moral judgment.
However, recent evidence shows that this is not the case.
Several studies suggest that, in the first year, infants are able
to distinguish between intentions and outcomes, they evaluate
helping, harming and distributive actions, and they rely, for these
evaluations, on intentions rather than outcomes.
Experimental studies used both elicited-response tasks
and spontaneous-response tasks in the violation-of-expectation
paradigm. Both research strategies found that, by the end of the
first year, infants are able to attend to agents’ intentions and
understand successful as well as failed actions (e.g., Woodward,
1998; Gergely and Csibra, 2003; Brandone and Wellman, 2009).
This early understanding of failed attempts generalizes to first-
as well as third-party socio-moral evaluations (Behne et al., 2005;
Dunfield and Kuhlmeier, 2010; Hamlin, 2013; Lee et al., 2015).
In studies on first-party evaluations, infants were engaged
in interactions with an experimenter and were presented with
actors that were either unwilling or unable to please them
(e.g., Behne et al., 2005; Dunfield and Kuhlmeier, 2010; Marsh
et al., 2010). While the outcomes were identical in both
conditions, intentions were different (negative for ‘unwilling
agents,’ positive for ‘unable agents’). Infants responded differently
to these two cases, showing that they used intention cues
to guide their first-party evaluations and preferences. Nine-
month-olds’ spontaneous signals of impatience (such as reaching
and banging or looking and turning away) revealed that they
become more agitated when they interact with actors unwilling
to provide them with a toy (Behne et al., 2005). Moreover,
using a manual choice measure (infants have to choose between
two contrasted individuals), some studies found that by the
second year of life, infants choose to help an unable over
an unwilling actor, when asked to help someone. By contrast,
infants were equally likely to help able agents, who displayed
positive intentions and successful actions, and unable agents, who
displayed positive intentions and unsuccessful actions (Dunfield
and Kuhlmeier, 2010). Overall, these studies show that infants
process information about intention and use it to evaluate others’
behavior.
Further studies on infants’ representations of harm and help
examined third-party socio-moral evaluations (e.g., Kuhlmeier
et al., 2003; Hamlin et al., 2007, 2013; Hamlin and Wynn, 2011;
Meristo and Surian, 2014). Infants observed events in which an
agent either helps or hinders the goal-directed action of another
agent. Their evaluations of prosocial and antisocial actors were
typically tested using a manual preference task. Early in their first
year of life, infants consistently prefer the helper over the hinderer
(Hamlin et al., 2007; Wynn, 2008). Also, at 16 months they
prefer agents performing fair over unfair distributive actions (e.g.,
Geraci and Surian, 2011). When evaluating an agent’s behavior,
infants are able to take into account not only a person’s intention,
but also other relevant mental states such as informational states
and beliefs (Hamlin et al., 2013; Meristo and Surian, 2013; Choi
and Luo, 2015; for a review: Baillargeon et al., 2015).
Hamlin (2013; see also Hamlin et al., 2013) played a puppet
show in which puppets either try but fail or succeed to help
(or hinder) someone’s goal-directed action. Eight-month-olds
preferred a helper (failed or successful) over a hinderer, but,
most importantly here, infants did not prefer the successful
helper (displaying both intention and relevant outcome) over
the puppet that attempted to help, but failed (showing a
good intention, but no relevant outcome). This suggests that
infants’ preferences were guided by agents’ intentions rather
than outcomes. Moreover, studying expectations by measuring
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spontaneous looking behavior, scholars recently found that by the
end of the first year, infants infer agents’ socio-moral preferences
by taking into account the agents’ information about others’
prosocial and antisocial intentions (Lee et al., 2015). They expect
that an agent would prefer to approach a second agent who
has previously shown a good intention, no matter what the
consequences of the second agent’s action were.
How can we reconcile the classic results of preschoolers’
outcome-to-intent shift with these recent results of infants’
intent-based expectations and evaluations? A lesson may be
learned from the literature on theory of mind.
HOW TO ACCOUNT FOR SEEMINGLY
CONFLICTING RESULTS: THE CASE OF
FALSE BELIEFS TASKS
The description of the intent-based judgment development
sketched above, that is, an initial intent-based evaluation
developing from an outcome-based evaluation that in turn shifts
again toward an intent-based evaluation, resembles the ‘puzzle
about belief ’ (Perner and Roessler, 2012), that is, the puzzle
regarding the development of Theory of Mind. Using traditional
elicited-response tasks to study children’s attributions of false
beliefs, researchers initially concluded that the ability to attribute
false beliefs does not emerge until about the fourth birthday
(e.g., Wimmer and Perner, 1983; Baron-Cohen et al., 1985;
Wellman et al., 2001). However, using violation-of-expectation
and anticipatory-looking spontaneous-response tasks, researchers
began to study also infants’ mentalizing abilities. Using these
and others tasks, scholars demonstrated that babies at least in
their second year of life are able to attribute reality congruent
and incongruent mental representations across several situations
(Southgate et al., 2007; Surian et al., 2007; Buttelmann et al., 2009;
Baillargeon et al., 2010; Luo, 2011; Low and Perner, 2012; Surian
and Geraci, 2012).
Why do 3-year-olds fail to attribute false beliefs when their
abilities are tested on elicited-response tasks? There are two
possible answers to this question. First, one may posit continuity
during development and argue that preschoolers fail because
they do not have the necessary executive function skills to pass
an elicited-response task. Second, one may posit a conceptual
change during development and argue that the representations
and processes involved in resolving spontaneous-response tasks
are fundamentally different from the ones involved in resolving
elicited-response tasks.
Young preschoolers may succeed in representing the agent’s
false belief, as infants do, but fail to select the right response
and inhibit the wrong response when they are questioned via
an elicited-response task (Leslie and Polizzi, 1998; Baillargeon
et al., 2010). An innate modular account posits that from an
early age babies are able to represent and use others’ mental
states to understand social situations (Leslie et al., 2005; Surian
et al., 2007; Kovács et al., 2010). What really develops is the
set of cognitive abilities that children need to exploit their
representational skills. At 3 years, executive function skills are
not sufficiently developed to meet the processing demands of the
elicited-response tasks (Thoermer et al., 2012). The continuity
account is receiving growing experimental support, but it is
still controversial. Many argue for a conceptual shift account
according to which infants that pass a spontaneous-response task
show a qualitatively different level of understanding compared to
children who pass an elicited-response task (e.g., Wellman, 2014).
RECONCILING RESULTS ON INFANTS
AND CHILDREN AT THE PROCESSING
LEVEL
As in the literature on false–belief understanding, we can draw a
distinction between two main positions. First, an emergence view
posits that during preschool years a conceptual change occurs
in moral competence. The construction of a novel conceptual
competence explains why school-aged children’s judgments
differ from preschoolers. This view does not deny the role
of executive function skills, as these are certainly involved in
theory construction and revision processes (Cushman et al.,
2013). Second, an expression view posits conceptual continuity
during development and sees the role of executive function in
a very different way. It claims that developmental differences
result solely from changes in executive function, or theory of
mind, that are external to the moral competence (Zelazo et al.,
1996; Chandler et al., 2001; Killen et al., 2011). We argue that
the studies on infants’ spontaneous socio-moral evaluations we
briefly reviewed above favor the latter view and challenge the
former, assuming that a “rich interpretation” (Aslin, 2000) of the
infant studies is the correct one. Studies on infants’ evaluations
suggest that infants can employ an intent-based concept of
moral goodness and badness in their socio-moral evaluations.
Therefore, the development of intent-based moral judgment is
unlikely to derive from a conceptual change occurring in the
preschool years.
If infants already possess an intent-based concept of moral
badness and goodness, can executive limitations account for
preschoolers’ outcome-based judgments? The expression view
claims that young preschoolers fail at weighting intentions
more than outcomes because of processing demands of the
task. The additional processing demands of the elicited-response
tasks compared to the spontaneous-response task used in the
infant literature, lead kindergartners to produce outcome-based
evaluations. With the acquisition of sufficient executive function
(roughly at 4), children’s responses on elicited-response tasks can
gradually match infants’ spontaneous ones, and become mostly
intent-based. When judging an action or an agent in elicited-
response tasks, for preschoolers it is difficult to suppress cues
concerning action outcomes, while older children may have the
sufficient executive function abilities to inhibit an outcome-based
judgment and select an intent-based response (or set shift to
an intent-based response, see Miyake et al., 2000; Diamond,
2013).
Highlighting how different tasks tap different forms of
evaluation, and distinguishing between elicited and spontaneous
responses may provide the key to solving the puzzle about
intent-based moral judgment, and avoiding two conclusions
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that appear highly implausible (Hamlin, 2013). First, it would
be implausible that an early tendency to privilege intentions
over outcomes emerges during infancy only to be replaced
during preschool years by the opposite tendency to privilege
outcomes over intentions, or to weight these cues equally,
and eventually be again replaced with a final tendency to
privilege intentions. Second, it would be also very odd to
posit that infants’ evaluation system is not related to the later
evaluation system, so that we would have two intent-based
moral evaluations mutually independent. Conversely, it is likely
that if an evaluation system emerges, it will not be replaced
later in the development by a new system that serves the exact
same function. In order to test directly the expression account,
future research should also investigate young preschoolers’
generation of intent-based moral evaluations in spontaneous-
response tasks.
ADDITIONAL FACTORS THAT MAY
AFFECT THE OUTCOME-TO-INTENT
SHIFT
In an expression view, several internal and external factors may
promote the emergence of an intent-based elicited response.
Among the internal factors, we can include the frontal lobe
maturation underlying the acquisition of executive functions
(Huttenlocher and Dabholkar, 1997; Benes, 2001; Miller and
Cohen, 2001; Moriguchi and Hiraki, 2009, 2011; Moriguchi,
2014; but see also Knight and Stuss, 2002; Lepsien and
Nobre, 2006). Among the plausible external factors, one could
include interactions with adults and peers (e.g, Tomasello
et al., 2005). Preschoolers start to be considered somewhat
responsible for their actions by their parents, and parents
correct their behaviors by pointing to actions outcomes (Piaget,
1932/1965) or negligence (Nobes et al., 2009). However,
this may not be true for infants and older school-aged
children. While infants’ actions outcomes are limited in
their valence and severity, and parents do not deem their
children fully responsible for what they cause, older children
develop a more controlled behavior, and parents or peers now
privilege a comprehensive evaluation of children’s intentions and
outcomes.
Now, moving from an explanation concerning proximal
causes (the processing level discussed in the previous section),
to an explanation concerning distal causes (the evolutionary
level), one promising perspective is offered by the life-history
theory. Life-history theory is an approach in evolutionary
biology that seeks to explain the timing of the organism’s
ontogenesis by linking it to relevant evolutionary pressures
(Kaplan and Gangestad, 2005). The emergence of a trait in
the phenotype has both costs and benefits for the organism
with regards to its reproductive fitness. The timing of such
emergence would optimize the costs/benefits trade-off by on-
setting a certain trait at a particular age, rather than earlier
or later. Originally, this perspective was employed to explain
the timing of morphological and physiological traits, such
as sexual maturation, but recently it has been argued that
it may also explain children’s delay in acting accordingly to
fairness principles (Sheskin et al., 2014). In fact, while infants
appear to evaluate others following an implicit understanding of
fairness and harm, only some years later they consistently apply
those moral principles during their social interactions (Siegal,
1982).
How can one apply life-history theory to the development
of intent-based moral reasoning? Advocates of life-history
theory may want to claim that the elicited intent-based moral
reasoning emerges roughly at 5–6 years because at this time-
point children increasingly engage in social interactions with
peers. To understand and properly evaluate others’ intentions
is fundamental in forming and maintaining such relationships.
Attending to agents’ intentions, rather than actions outcomes,
in the evaluations of agents, may become crucial just at
the age in which children, in the evolutionary past, could
not rely anymore on ‘free’ resources provided by parents
and had to rely on their interactions with peers, avoiding
potentially dangerous conflicts (Marlowe, 2005). Therefore,
life-history theory may explain both the growing concern
for fairness and the growing reliance on agents’ intention
in preschoolers. The defendants of this position may then
conclude that the human mind is wired with an innate
ability to understand and evaluate others’ intentions, but it
is only during the late preschool years that this ability is
systematically recruited by children in a variety of social
interactions.
CONCLUSION
In sum, we have seen that young preschoolers’ outcome-
based judgment is preceded by an early capacity to evaluate
intentions that is revealed in spontaneous-response tasks.
Drawing a parallel with the literature on the acquisition
of mental state reasoning, we argued that the outcome-to-
intent shift is best explained by an expression account that
posits an early emerging infant socio-moral competence and
explains preschoolers’ outcome-based judgments as due to
immature domain-general executive function. Current evidence
is more consistent with a view that assumes developmental
continuity than with the opposite view based on conceptual
changes.
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